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INTRODUCTION: 
 
Of the myriad of pressing topics current in medical law and ethics, the issue of 
informed consent appears to be the ‘plainer sibling’. The decision by Cranston 
J in Birch v UCL Hospital NHS Foundation Trust in 2008 has brought into 
sharp relief that which many commentators already held to be true. Far from 
being the ‘plainer sibling’ when weighed against other prominent issues in 
medical law and ethics, the doctrine of informed consent, is one of the most 
significant principles to emerge in recent years. The doctrine, aimed at both 
enabling and empowering patients who have traditionally been largely mute 
and powerless in the face of medical expertise and authority1, places upon 
clinicians legal and professional obligations regarding informed consent. The 
doctrine therefore mandates the provision of information upon which patients 
can fashion their own views and decisions about the nature and manner of 
their medical care. Informed consent is therefore at the forefront of the patient 
autonomy movement. And through this movement a general restructuring of 
the relationship between patient and clinician has taken place. The decision in 
Birch is indicative of the courts increasing willingness to erode clinician 
autonomy; although it is somewhat questionable as to what extent this erosion 
has benefited or strengthened patient autonomy in anything more than an 
illusionary sense. 
BACGROUND  
 
Mrs Birch suffered a stroke caused by a cerebral catheter angiogram at the 
defendant's Hospital in 2003. The angiogram was undertaken to exclude the 
possibility that Mrs Birch had a posterior communicating artery aneurysm, a 
potentially life-threatening condition. Given her history and presentation, Mrs 
Birch contended that the defendant Trust was negligent in deciding to 
																																																								
1 Katz, J. 1981. Disclosure and consent in psychiatric practice. In Law and ethics in the 
practice of psychiatry, edited by C. K. Hofling, 91-117. New York: Brunner/Mazel. 
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undertake an angiogram and that the investigation of her condition should 
have been through the non-invasive method of magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI). The claimant also contended that in failing to disclose the comparative 
risks of the angiogram as compared to the MRI her consent to the procedure 
was vitiated.  
 
The court was asked to consider whether, in discharging their duty to obtain 
the informed consent of the claimant, the defendant was simply required to 
describe the technique and make the claimant aware of the risks associated 
with the procedure; or alternatively, whether informed consent in fact legally 
required that the defendant make the patient aware of the different imaging 
modalities available and also discuss with her their relative strengths and 
weaknesses in investigating her condition. Dismissing the claimant’s first 
argument, Cranston J went on to find the defendant liable in negligence for 
their failure to disclose the comparative risks of the cerebral catheter 
angiogram as compared to the MRI.  
 
COMMENT: 
 
Whilst the judgment of Cranford J does not make specific reference to the 
professional guidelines, it is in the opinion of this author no unhappy accident 
that updated GMC guidelines on consent had come into force some months 
earlier. These revised guidelines make specific reference to the disclosure of 
comparative risks. 
 
 
“The potential benefits, risks and burdens, and the likelihood of success, 
for each option.”2 
 
																																																								
2 Paragraph 9(e) Consent: Doctors and Patients Working in Partnership GMC Guidelines 
2008  
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The 2008 GMC guidelines envisage clinicians working in partnership with 
patients to make treatment decisions.   
 
“You must work in partnership with your patients. You should discuss with them their 
condition and treatment options in a way they can understand, and respect their right 
to make decisions about their care. You should see getting their consent as an 
important part of the process of discussion and decision-making, rather than as 
something that happens in isolation”3 
 
These guidelines are robust, detailed and aspirational in nature, which is of 
course wholly appropriate for good practice guidelines; after all the law 
provides the base line below which clinicians should not fall. Yet this author 
finds herself asking are we not entitled to expect more than mere baseline 
conformity with regard to clinical disclosure? The profession itself appears to 
have answered this question in the affirmative, and as such the GMC 
guidelines create an overriding duty to disclose comparative risks. The 
decision in Birch appears to finally give this overriding duty a legal footing. 
 
The justification for giving prominence to the issue of the onerous detail of 
these guidelines, relates to an argument promulgated by Staunch4, who 
submits that it may simply be a matter of time before these diligent and 
onerous guidelines become transformed via the Bolam test into a legal 
requirement.  This in itself is presents no difficulty provided that professional 
guidelines are always sufficiently calibrated to the clinical reality of modern 
medical practice. In short they must be reasonably attainable in a resource 
and time deficient NHS. A failure to calibrate guidelines to such constraints 
may result in clinicians being judged according to an unattainable legal 
standard.  
 
Turning back once more to the decision in Birch, the judgment of Cranford J, 
is - with the greatest respect - ambiguous in one crucial aspect, and that is 
																																																								
3 Consent: Doctors and Patients Working in Partnership GMC Guidelines 2008 p04  
 
4 Staunch, M, 'Causation and confusion in respect of medical non-disclosure: Chester v 
Afshar (2005) 14 Nott LJ 66: 
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with reference to when a duty to disclose comparative risks will arise: 
Cranford J glosses over this important issue at paragraph 77 when he states: 
 
“As a matter of law it is difficult to state in general terms when the duty to 
inform about comparative risk arises. Suffice to say that in my judgment, in 
the special circumstances of Mrs Birch's case, there was a duty to discuss the 
comparative risks of the catheter angiography alongside MRI”’. 
 
This decision will do little to comfort clinicians already struggling to ascertain 
what the law requires of them with regard to informed consent. This decision 
is however, consistent with the chronology of case law, which gradually 
appears to be eroding clinician autonomy, but, crucially, it is consistent with 
the professions’ own mandate.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
If we accept that patient autonomy and the right to self-determination are 
concepts of value and are worthy of protection, the quest for more appropriate 
legal protection than that which is offered by the law of negligence should not 
be abandoned. Reform which imposes liability for the dignitary harm caused 
by interference with the patient’s ability to reach an autonomous decision 
offers promise both in terms of tempering the ‘central ambiguity’ 5 inherent in 
non-disclosure claims, and significantly enabling clinicians to practice more 
safely and effectively through transparency.   
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5 Cane, P, A Warning about Causation (1999) 115 Law Quarterly Review 21-7, 23 
